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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
F.Jl.A. FINANCIAL CORPORATION,
:t

n1rporation,

1

Plaintiff and Respondent,

- vs. HFfLD, J NC., a corporation, OvVEN /
E C<lNHAD, BETTY CONRAD, his
11ifr, i\I lCHAgL PLATNER and JANE

Case No.
10292

DCll~ PLA'rNER, his wife, and RUTH
n1 FB'Y,
Defendants and Appellants.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
~TA'l'El\fENT

OF THE KIND OF CASE

Tliis is an action to foreclose a real estate mortgage
µwen to secure the payment of a promissory note, which
was i11 turn given in payment of a real estate commission
'anwd by Cook Realty Company.
DISPOSITION OF THE LOvVER COURT
On plaintiff's l\fotion for Summary Judgment based
the pleadings and deposition of Richard J. Strom-

11 J"•ll

2

ness (R-15) the trial court found for th<> iilai 11 1·11· 1· ...
against the defendant (R-3-t). RuhsP(lUPntl,- tJ 1,. t t.· .
dant filed a .Motion for .Modification of .Judrrrn(•nt
il'\-.1111
· .·
b
which was denied ( R-Gl).
111111

...~

(

~ ' I L) I

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmation of the rnlings of th"
trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent disagrees ·with the Statement of FacL·
in appellant's Brief on the grounds that (1) it is ineon
plete, and (2) it is misleading. 1'he 8tah•rnPnt of Fan.'
is misleading when it states that the salP of tlw dv!'1 n
dant Build, Inc.'s apartment house compll'tdy fnil1·il
(Appellant's Brief p. -±), whereas tlw transaetion rl1il
not fail completely. The defendant later rcpos~r~.-~r·d
the apartment house he sold to dt>fendanb Conrail
(D-12). (Note: The deposition of Richard .J. ~tromn1";,.
president of defendant Build, Inc., is a part of tlw n·r·11 r·i
hut was not paginated as such. References to page~ ni
the deposition are indicated by '·D.") HowevPr, thL· ,],
fendant retained all of the consideration it had rcren·iil
as down payment on the sale of the apartment lw11"
(D-10, 11). Hespondent asserts that a more ulijr·cti">
1

statement of the facts is :
On or about Au!mst 3 1959 Build, Tu('., Yirtnaii.1
b
'
'
1
wholly ow·ned by :Mr. Richard Strornness ( D-:3), r•:.:rTllt :
a listing agreement with Cook Rt'.alty Cou11 1any 1(1 " '
1

3
;q1adnw11t hom;e located at 32 \Yest Seventh South
~1 :"• t, ~ali Lab~ City, Utah (D--1-, 5 ), and agreed to pay
, 1 ··al ,,state eommission as rec01m11enckd by the Salt
/,:iii•' JiPal KstatP Board (D-5, 6). The recommended real
i·.-tnte 1·0111111ission at the time of the listing agreement
,.., 1 ~ :i<;c of the sale price of the property sold (D-8).
11 11 11r nlio1;t DPcember 19, 1959, the defendant Build, Inc.
, ;1t1·r«d iJ1to an "Earnest ~foney Receipt and Exchange
\~r1·1·1tl1·11t" >VhPreby it agreed to sell the apartment
i:uu~e to defendants Owen E. Conrad and Betty Conrad,
l1i~ \\ ifr, and agreed to receive as a down payment a
dupl1·x lo('atl'd at 5867 South 157 ~West, Murray, Utah
t l>-7, S).
The sale price of the apartment house, as
agTL'('(l to hy Build, Inc. for purposes of computing the
1. il11111ission, was $77,500.00 (D-7), 5% of which is $3,·'/:i.0(). At the time of completing this transaction, Build,
Inc .. Ji;· ::\! r. Stromness, signed an agreement incorporating 1hl' foreg·oing provisions and again agreeing to
pay a rt-al Pstate commission to •Cook Realty Company
1D-i, ::\ and Plaintiff's Ex. 2 to Deposition).
111

On Fehruaq 15, 1960, the defendant Build, Inc., by
,\1 r. f.;1 rnrnm•ss, executed a promissory note and mort::;ag1· in the snm of $3,875.00 in favor of Cook Realty
l '111upany, tlw mortgage covering the duplex property
l '1·1•iYt->d in exchange for the apartment house (D-9, 10).
Tlt1' 11otc- and mortgage were given in payment of the
11 ·<d (·"ltatP commission mentioned.
The mortgage was
·1111.1 l'<'t'ord('d (Ex. P. 2) and the defendant Build, Inc.
1
J aid four pa~·ments of $50.00 each on the said obligation,
la~l onP having been made on December 15, 1960
;IJJJ. 1:2). From February 15, 1960 to the date this
1

•

4
sujt was filed, Build, Inc. has considered itself
tlie ()\.11111
.
of the duplex property and has treated jt accordin;;J,
(D-10, 11). On August 10, 19G-t, Cook Realty Compau;
assigned the note and mortgage to respondent hen,i;1
(R-33; Ex. P. 3, 4).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
A PARTY OPPOSING A MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT Musrr FILE SOThlE
EVIDENCE TO REBUT THE EVIDBl\1 CI~
RELIED UPON BY THE l\IOVING PARTY.
Appellant has quoted language from numerous case~
indicating the desire of courts to give each party ib <la:
in court. "With this general language respondP11t lw'
no quarrel. However, when evidence has been ohtai1ll'il
and the opposing party is conversant with that evid~m~
and it is upon this evidence which the moving pnrt1
will rely, the opposing party owes a duty to submit at
least an indication of contrary evidence rather than ju~t
unsupported allegations. Dupler v. Yates, 10 T;tah ~d
251, 351 P.2d 624 (1960).
In the case before the court the plaintiff and n'spondent relied upon the instruments (note and mort1
gage, etc.) and the deposition of Build, Inc.'s prrsidPn
Mr. Stromness, with the exhibits attached to the dcJll"
sition. Build, Inc. offered no additional c vide11cP, '" 1t!'
the exception of two Affidavits (R. 48, -t9, 51) 11 hii!
princjpally reiterate the contents of the deposition. ,\'
0

5
\ia~

i'lati·d in Dupler v. Yates, supra, at 10 Utah 2d at

C\·rtainly, if the summary judgment procedure
is to be E~ffective, it must be held that when
adequate proof is submitted in support of the
motion the pleadings are not sufficient to raise
an issue of fact. [Emphasis supplied]
1· pon

* * *

a motion for summary judgment, the
~ourts ought to recognize, as a minimum, that
tlw opposing party produce some evidentiary
matter in contradiction of the movant's case, or
s1wcify in an affidavit the reason why he cannot
do so.
As will be seen in the following points, there is no
IJa~i~ for any of the allegations made by the defendant
in Rupport of its original defense (R-11), or any of the
d~fonses enumerated in its Motion for Modification of
.Judgl!lent (R-5G).

POINT II
THERE IS NO BASIS IN THE RECORD

FOR ANY OF THE DEFENSES RAISED BY
DEJTl1~NDANT.

A. LACK OF CONSIDERATION.
Tli<> defendant originally pleaded lack of consider:\! tOJt for the note and mortgage as a defense to this
~nit brought thereon. The undeniable and undenied facts
an· that the defendant owned an apartment house which
111 • lii,(pd with Cook Realty Company under a standard
t''mn written real estate contract (D-5, 6 and Plaintiff's

6

1£x. 1 to Deposition). The real estate commission at ti:,
time of the listing agreement was 5% of the. sal(·- 11I .-li'1
of the property (D-8). The defendant Build, lne., hayi 11 ..
been introduced to the defendants Conrad throu~h tJi:.
efforts of Cook Realty Company, C'ntered into an ag 11 .,
ment to sell the apartment house to the defendant~ c111 ,
rad and received the duplex which is tlw subject of t\ii,
action as a down payment (D-7, 8). The sale iwieP i'
the apartment house was $77,500.00 (D-7 and PlaintiL'.,
Ex. 2 to Deposition), 5% of which is $3,875.00, th<· ori.~i
nal face amount of the note sued upon.
At the time this suit was brought, Build, Ine. w:1<
still the record title owner of the duplex property \\lid
it received as a down payment for the sale of its a11artment house (D-10). With respect to the duplex, Build.
Inc. has made payments on the first mortgage tlwm.:1
(D-10), it has collected the rents from the property, n1
ranged for the necessary maintenance and lmn1 euttin~
on the property, and when vacancies occurred it Jin'
obtained tenants to fill them; in all respects it has tn·at~il
the duplex as though it owned the property (D-11).
Counsel for plaintiff misstates the case when Ji,
says that the consideration for the sale compldely faiJi.,I
(Appellant's Brief pp. 4, 5). Build, Inc. prevailed in::
suit brought against it by the Conrads for misrepn"'en
tation (D-14). While Build, Inc. did in fact repo~'r''
the apartment house, it also retained the down pnymi n'
i.e., the duplex. There was ample considerati011 for
sale and the note and mortgage given for the comrnissinll
which considerations never did fail and have not faiJ,,,;

7

time. The realtor is not responsible for
, 11 11~<'qncut events which transpire between parties the
n·;iltor introduced.

'.i• rl1L' pn'seut

B. ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.
,\.n arcord and satisfaction is defined at 1 C.J.S.
iii!, ,lrcord rwd Satisfaction, Sec. 1 as an agreement
11l1<·n·li) mw of the partit's undertakes to give or perform and the other to accept, in satisfaction of a claim,
-<1111t<"ll1ing other than or different from what he is, or
1·.onsicl<'rs, himself entitled to; and a satisfaction is the
«'\('rntion or performance of such agreement. Howevn,
in onkr to have an accord there must be a proper legal
""n;-.idl'ration. 1 C.J.S. 473, Accord and Satisfaction, Sec.
4. ~eP also Ralph A. Badger & Cornpany v. Fidelity
Jfol/rli11q (L' Loan Association, 94 Utah 97, 75 P. 2d 669
I l93S).

It i:-; \YPll settled in Utah that where a claim or dernancl is li11uidated and is not in dispute and is presently
1lrn· or overdue, the payment by the debtor and acceptHJH'(' by tliP creditor at the place where payment of the
rl1-ht is vro1ier to be made, of a part only of the debt,
ur any amount of money less than the whole amount
11ltid1 is due, affords no consideration for an agreement
In· tilt' en•ditor to discharge the unpaid balance of the
IP/it. Onn; 1·. Bullen, 50 Utah 270, 167 P. 683 (1917).
In e<nml'ction with its claimed defense of an accord
<li1d :-;atisl'adion, the appellant relies upon Ralph A.
r::11lr11r & Company V. Fidelity Building & Loan Associ111·"!1. 9 ~Utah 97, 75 P.2d 669 (1938) as holding that "the

8
settlement of an unliquidated or disputed claim wher" tJ 11,
parties are apart in good faith presents consideratinn
for an accord and satisfaction." Even by 1\lr. Strmimi·~,·
own testimony, the parties were never "apart," "in goqr\
faith," or otherwise. 1\Ir. Stromness testified that Ji 1•
felt he had made a bad deal ·when he sold his aparhuf'nt
house and that Mr. Cook had told him if he made 011 1'
more payment he would forget the whole thing (D. 1~.
13). The Badger case holds that where a elaim is di·finitely and admittedly owing, the agreement to taki· a
lesser amount, though followed by a satisfaction of tlrnt
agreement, is not good unless attended by some ermsideration. 94 Utah 97 at 98.
C.

ACCOUNT STATED.

An account stated is an agreement between the parties as to the accuracy of an account and that the halanrt
struck is correct; there must be a promise then, expn,~'
or implied, for the payment of such balance. 1 C.J.S.
693, Account Sfoted, Sec. 1. "It is not proper to n'31 n
stated account upon a liquidated demand already agr~l'd
upon and which either party is bound to pay, as,
instance, a promissory note ... " 1 C.J.S. 700, Acco111if
Stated, Sec. 15d. Since that is this situation exactly, tlwn
is no basis for an account stated. There is nothing con
tained in 1\Ir. Stromness' deposition nor m any otl1i·:
papers filed which indicates otherwise.
D.

LACHES

There is nothing in the record to support a defr 11 ' '
of laches. As a matter of fact, we do not see 110\\' '·111
1

9

:ir

on a note and mortgage given pursuant to the
lai\ ~ ol' tlw State of rtah can be defended on the ground
.ii' laehes, \\·hen the period preseribed by the Statute of
[,imitatiom; has not run. Lacl1es is a defense basPd upon
tli1· inadion of a claimant for a long period of time, coup]r·rl with a change of position by the person against
1\'lwrn thl' elaim is asserted, all of vvhich would make it
i111·q11itable for the claimant to assert his claim. It is
1·~.,ent iall~' an equitable defense.
11,111

Section 78-1:2-:23, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, pro1iil1·:-; that there is a six year Statute of Limitations on
riiJligations in writing. The present statute is substant1all~· tlw same as Section 104-2-22 Utah Code Annotated,
l'"i.), 11·l1i<'h has been held to govern mortgage foreclosure
prnceedings. Crompton v. Jensen, 78 Utah 55, 1 P.2d
l+l. It sPems fairly well established that where mortgage foreclosures are governed by a Statute of Limitations, tl1<> equitable principle of laches is not applicable
to th\" <lef ernw of a foreclosure proceeding brought before
tlw (·xpi ration of the statutory period. M cK inn on v.
il1111l11·y, 1G5 P.2d 286, 178 Ore. 45; Riordan v. Ferguson,
1+1 :F'.2d 983 (2d Cir. 1945); Monroe County Savings
Dulik r. Baker, 2G4 N.Y.S. 101, 147 Misc. 522. The rea'r111ing h('hind these cases is quite obvious. A mortgage
110kl1•r may now wish to give a mortgagor every opporLi111ty to a.void the loss of his property. But if by so
rluin!-!. lw ma~· be yireeluded from enforcing his debt be, :\li..;1.• of his dday, he will rush to the courthouse at the
iirsl <ld'anlt, a rather unfortunate situation.

10
vV f' snbmit therefore, that lac hes is no dl'f Pnl'i· ti• ..
foreclosure action where the a1)plicable Statutp ill' J_,11111.
tations is six y0ars and the action has lwrn llrong-1 11 nilli
slightly over four years from tlw date of thP in<·"pti,,;:
of the obligation. The cases and annotations citP<l 11,
Appellant are not pertinent and do not f'up1>ort iL: 1111
sition.
POINT III
THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY Jl'DGMENT vV AS PR 0 P E R LY GRANTED
'
THERE \VAS NO BASIS FOR GRANTl~U
THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR MODfFICATION OF JUDG~1ENT AND THE RFLING OF THE LO\VER COURT SHOULD BE
AFFIRMED.

The case was commenced the first l\'(;ek in Angu>t
and service was made upon the defendant prior to Augwt
14, 196± (R-32). The defendant filed its Ans\\'Pr St>pt1'lll·
ber 2' 196±' alleg-ingas its onlv
~
~
. defense the lack of eou·
sideration for the obligation sued upon ( R-11 ). Tlti
plaintiff thereafter served Notice of Taking of Dqio.+
tion (R-13, 1±) and did in fact take the defrmlant Blli~il.
Inc. 's deposition, by and through its principal o\ntl'l'
and officer, Richard ,J. Stromness, on Septemlwr l~.
196± (D-1). In that deposition plaintiff explored nll 1·'
the facts surrounding this transaction, to tlw end tlia:
the plea of lack of consideration was shown to han 11 •
substance in fact. Still no steps were takt·n by defrn·
.
dant's counsel to amend or othenns<'
qua l'i t"~ it-·
pleadings.

11
ll1•·i•'al'kr tlw plaintiff made it:-; Motion for Sum.. ,11 1 .I 1tdg11wnt (R-15 ). ThL' cld'c•nclant fil1·cl no plt•ad:i~> 1111111 after the date sclwclulecl for the liParing on
ii:· \l()tion; at that time defrndant's counsc•l fih·d a
\k 11 111r:rnd111n in '.d1id1 he argtwd as reason for denial
.,i tlw 1notion tlw defense of an accord and satisfaction
, J{-~:n. 'l'lu•re \\·as no contention of lacht>s or aecount
-tatiid at that time. In spite of the improper wa~' in
\I l1i(·li the is:-;ue of accord and satisfaction \\·as raised,
ii:» ('olll't <·<msidered and rejected it as a defense. Prop' 1!1· ,011. Jt was not until the Motion for Summary J udg1111·111 m1s granted and the Findings and Decree were
, 11t1·1Hl that the defendant raised the issue of account
':.«fi'rl arnl ladws (R-5G); it raised these issues without
;11:1 1·'.1ilanation as to why they had not been raised

TlH; hrn· reqmres that after a judgment has been
11·11d1•red, the~ losing party must show that there existed
11·a~(lns for a contrary rP:rnlt of which he, in the exercise
11[' drn· 1lilig<•ncC', was not aware. Rules 59 and GO(b) Utah

1:1i/1, uj Ci1 ii Procedure; Kettner u. 811ow, 13 l~. 2d 382,

::1.-1 l '.:.'.d '.28. Nothing which tht> defendant, its president
''' it;-; cotm:-;d has pn'sented, either in the Affidavits, in
i!w dq1oc;i ti on, or in any other pleading filed herein, con':1in~ t>Yid1·nce or material which C?ould not havt> been
i 1.. ~1·nt1·d for tlw court to consider at tlu• time of the
11
1 ·:i1irn..!_· on tlu• Motion for Summary Judg111ent. lndC'ed,
;i~I 1li1· 1·c;c;pntial facts now all<>gwl \\'Pre tht>n presented.
J',, all1m thP defendant to cornt> in and amend its pleadii,!2.' altd rni~e a \\·hole new series of i:-sues, based on no

12
new facts nor a showing of diligt'nce, would emascnlati·
Rule 56 U.R.C.P.
POINT IY.
ATTORNEYS' FEE SHOULD BE ADJUSTED.
The attorneys' fees awarded plaintiff were ba~ 1 ,J
upon the Advisory Schedule of Fees and Charges pul,lished by the Salt Lake County Bar Association. Thi
fees were computed on that section of the Schedult· 111: 1
taining to unsecured notes and contracts rather tl1a:1
secured notes and contracts. As a result the attornp1,,'
fee was in excess of the amount recommended h~- 1!11·
County Bar by the sum of $42.07. The plaintiff agT1·:,
to reduce its judgment by that amount.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's ruling in these matters was comet
and the judgment below should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
l\f OYLE & l\f OYLE
Hardin A. -Whitney, Jr.

Attorneys for Plaintiff d
Respondent
810 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Ptah

